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By Bruce C. Beal
Survey of Recent Legislation Affecting Police Officers
and Firefighters
I. Introduction
Police officers and firefighters tradi-
tionally have enjoyed special treat-
ment under the Illinois Public Labor
Relations Act (IPLRA).1 Most signifi-
cantly, the IPLRA prohibits police
officers and firefighters from strik-
ing.2  Section 14 of the Act, allows them
to present economic and non-economic
issues to a tripartite panel of
arbitrators for resolution.3    While this
treatment does not follow the tradi-
tional approach to balancing economic
and bargaining power under the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA),
both employers and unions must
continue to bargain collectively and in
good faith for all units organized in any
municipalities (both home rule and
non-home rule) and counties. Re-
cently, the legislature has enacted
numerous statutes that affect police
officers and firefighters. This article
examines these recent legislative
changes and their impact on collective
bargaining.
II. Public Acts 095-0136 and
095-0356
The legislature amendmended the
Counties Code and the Illinois
Municipal Code concerning the rights
of police officers and firefighters to
compel collective bargaining of an
alternative dispute resolution proce-
dure for discipline.  Public Act 095-
0136 amended the Sheriff's Merit
System Law and was effective
January 1, 2008.4  Public Act 095-0356
amends the Police and Fire Commis-
sion Act and was effective upon being
signed into law on August 23, 2007.5
Before these amendments, the Fourth
District Appellate Court in Nall v.
International Association of Machin-
ist and Aerospace Workers, held that
counties governed by the Sheriff's
Merit System Law (Merit Law) were
prohibited from bargaining over
disciplinary measures covered by the
Merit Law.6 In Nall, the court held
that the Adams County Sheriff was
not required to bargain over a union
proposal to arbitrate employee disci-
pline because the Merit Law provided
for a mandatory statutory method of
discipline and review.7 Although there
was no similar case holding under the
Municipal Code prior to Public Act
095-0356, the same result could have
been reached by analogizing the cities
and municipalities covered by Boards
of Fire and Police Commissioners to
the county sheriffs covered under the
Merit Law since disciplinary proce-
dures were permissive subjects of
bargaining under both statutes prior
to the amendments.8  Public Acts 095-
0136 and 095-0356 resolved the
conflict between the Nall decision and
what formerly was an exclusive and
unilateral right of the Fire and Police
Commissioners and Merit System
Board to discipline employees. Public
Act 095-0136 provided, in relevant
part:
However, on and after June 1,
2007, in any sheriff's office with a
collective bargaining agreement
covering the employment of
department personnel, such disci-
plinary measures and the method
of review of those measures shall
be subject to mandatory bargain-
ing, including, but not limited to,
the use of impartial arbitration as
an alternative or supplemental
form of due process. 9
Public Act 095-0136 amended the
Municipal Code which had previously
provided that bargaining over arbitra-
tion as an alternative to disciplinary
hearings before the Fire and Police
Commissioners in non-home rule
municipalities was permissive. As
amended, the statute now reads,
"Such bargaining [for arbitration of
discipline] shall be mandatory unless
the parties mutually agree otherwise.
Any such alternative agreement shall
be permissive."10
Thus, dispute resolution alterna-
tives concerning employee discipline is
a mandatory subject of bargaining in
any local police department, fire
department, or county sheriff's office
with a collective bargaining agree-
ment covering the employment of de-
partment personnel. Moreover, Pub-
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lic Act 095-0356 now requires equal
treatment for police officers and
firefighters from home rule and non-
home rule units of government by
imposing the mandatory bargaining
requirement on both governmental
units "unless the parties mutually
agree otherwise."11  As a practical
matter, arbitration will be the
primary tool of dispute resolution for
disciplinary measures taken against
police officers and firefighters.  It is
still possible to use the Fire and Police
Commission or the Sheriff's Merit
Commission to settle disciplinary
disputes, provided the parties mutally
agree to do so or it is awarded in a
Section 14 interest arbitration.
The legislative change under Public
Act 095-0356 amending the Municipal
Code is consistent with the First
District Appellate Court's decision in
City of Calumet City v. Illinois
Fraternal Order of Police Labor
Council.12  In that case, the court held
that Calumet City, as a home rule
unit, could adopt any procedure for
reviewing discipline, including a
procedure  different than that provided
for under the Municipal Code.13  The
new legislation essentially codifies the
results of Calumet City for home rule
units and overrules City of Markham
v. State and Municipal Teamsters,
which held that a non-home rule unit
could not adopt a provision contrary
the Municipal Code for the review of
discipline for police officers.14
These legislative changes will
certainly invite negotiations over the
use of grievance and arbitration
procedures covering discharge and
suspension, barganing subjects that
were either permissive or not subject
to collective bargaining at all under
the old statutory regimes.  In those
situations where counties have used
the Merit Commission and cities and
municipalities have used the Fire and
Police Commission, employers can
expect to see union requests to opt out
of those procedures because they tend
to be viewed by unions as favoring
employers.  This is especially so where
the employers appoint the commission
members. The unions will likely
migrate toward resolving disciplinary
reviews through third party arbitra-
tion.  On the other hand, there are
many collective bargaining agree-
ments already in existence that
contain grievance and arbitration
procedures covering discharge and
suspension, notwithstanding the Merit
Law and the Illinois Municipal Code as
they existed prior to the amendments.
Very little change will be requested in
those situations since the legislative
changes merely legitimize the proce-
dures that were formally in place.
Since most contracts already have a
dispute resolution process, whether it
be through the Law, the Fire and
Police Commission Act or through
arbitration contractually provided for,
any request to change will likely be
seen by an interest arbitrator as a
request for a breakthrough. In this
situation, arbitrators are more likely
to leave the process that is already in
place, thereby encouraging the parties
to bargain collectively over its change,
taking advantage of the "give and
take" process at the bargaining table.
It is unlikely that an arbitrator will
change an existing contractual provi-
sion for dispute resolution without a
compelling reason to do so.
III. Public Act 095-0293
The Legislature amended the Uniform
Peace Officers' Disciplinary Act to
include the Illinois Secretary of State's
sergeants, lieutenants, commanders
and investigator trainees under the
definition of "Officer."15 Previously,
these enumerated employees were
specifically exempted from the statute's
coverage.16 This change will very
likely have little if any impact on any
bargaining unit except those covered
by the Secretary of State's Office.
What the amendment will require is
that the Secretary of State's Office be
very mindful of the Uniform Peace
Officers' Disciplinary Act and its
application to investigations done of its
police employees for disciplinary
reasons.  A failure to follow the Act and
its formal investigation procedures
may lead to an improper discharge of
an employee and most likely will
eliminate the use of any information
obtained during a formal investiga-
tion17 as being the "fruit of the
poisonous tree."18  The amendment
was effective on January 1, 2008.19
IV. Public Act 095-0024
The Legislature amended the Ilinois
Criminal Code of 1961 to provide that
officers, agents, or employees of the
Federal Government commissioned by
federal statute to make arrests for
violations for federal criminal laws,20
will now be considered peace officers.21
This legislative change will have little
if any effect on collective bargaining
agreements established under the
IPLRA.  If unions are concerned that
the federal officer will usurp duties
normally performed by sheriff's
deputies or municipal police officers,
they may request contract language or
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side agreements prioritizing how a
particular case is handled once an
arrest is made.  At the very least, this
new legislation will spark discussion
among the parties as to how it affects
bargaining unit employees.
V. Public Act 095-0025
Public Act 095-0025 amended the
Illinois Human Rights Act (IHRA) by
adding a new paragraph,  making it a
civil rights violation for any employer
to refuse a pregnant peace officer or
firefighter's request for a temporary
transfer to a less strenuous or less
hazardous position.22 However, the
employee's request must be made with
the advice of her physician and the
employer need only approve the
transfer if the request is reasonable.23
The Act is unclear as to whether
employers must create a new position
or whether, like the  Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA)24 the transfer
need only be made if a position of that
nature is available and vacant.25  This
new legislation may find its way into
collective bargaining negotiations in
which unions will attempt to bargain
for the creation of alternative positions
for those females in the bargaining
unit that may become pregnant and
need a transfer.  When confronted with
a transfer request, an employer should
make the same analysis and inquiry
that it would make for a reasonable
accommodation request under the
ADA.  Absent any other direction, this
would be the safest course of conduct
for employers to take when confronted
with this situation.  This amendment
took effect on January 1, 2008.
VI. Public Act 095-0128
Effective January 1, 2008, the Whistle
Blower and Whistleblower Reward
and Protection Acts were amended.
The Whistle Blower Act was amended,
as follows: (1) state units of local
government and school districts were
added to the definition of "Employer";26
(2) Section 15 was amended to provide
that an employer may not retaliate
against an employee who discloses
information in a court case, adminis-
trative hearing, before a legislative
commission, or in any other legal
proceedings;27  and Section 40 was
added, creating a limitation on home
rule authority.28
The Amendments to the
Whistleblower Reward and Protection
Act do not stop at the inclusion of units
of local government and school
districts into the definition of "State".
The amendments further added the
following causes of action as "false
claims": (1) knowingly taking an
adverse employment action against an
employee for disclosing information to
a government or law enforcement
agency if the employee reasonably
believes that the information discloses
a violation of a law, rule or
regulation;29 and (2) knowingly retali-
ating against an employee for
disclosing information in a court,
administrative hearing, before a
legislative commissioner or commit-
tee, or in another legal proceeding, if
the employee reasonably believes that
the information discloses a violation of
a law, rule or regulation.30
These amendments are significant
because they extend whistleblowing
rights to all public employees who were
not previously covered under the Act
unless their employer elected to be
covered.  The home rule limitation
contained in the Whistle Blower Act
prohibits a home rule entity from
imposing any limitations or restric-
tions on the whistleblowing rights of
its employees.31 In particular, an
employer, public or private, may not
retaliate against an employee for
disclosing information to a govern-
ment or a law enforcement agency,
where the employee has reasonable
cause to believe that the information
discloses a violation of a state or federal
law, rule or regulation.32
The legislation is especially signifi-
cant in light of the United States
Supreme Court's ruling in Garcetti v.
Ceballos.33   In Garcetti, the Court held
that public employee speech made
pursuant to the employee's job
responsibilities was not protected by
the First Amendment against adverse
employment actions.  The Court, thus
severely restricted the First Amend-
ment rights of public employees to
freely make disclosures without
retribution.34   The amendment to the
Illinois statute was a reaction to the
Garcetti decision and was designed to
to protect public employees who make
certain disclosures.
VII. Public Act 095-0490
Effective June 1, 2008, Public Act 095-
0490 amends the Illinois Municipal
Code to provide that any fire
department or fire protection district
that is subject to a collective
bargaining agreement shall not use a
person who has not qualified for a
regular appointment as a temporary
or permanent substitute for classified
members or for regular appointment
as a classified member, "unless mutu-
ally agreed to" by the municipality
and the union.35  This new provision
requires that employers governed by
collective bargaining agreements use
only persons who have qualified for
regular appointment under the provi-
sions of Division One of Article X
(Employees and Employment) of the
Municipal Code (certified employees).36
The subject of using non-certified
firefighters for either permanent or
temporary positions is a permissive
subject of bargaining under the
amendment.37   The same permissive
subject rule applies to municipalities
or districts that were using a non-
certified employee as a substitute prior
to June 1, 2008.38 They can only
continue to do so by mutual agreement
of the union and the employer.39   Home
rule units are prohibited from
regulating the hiring or substitution
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of members of a municipal fire
department inconsistent with provi-
sions of the Amendment.40
Since it is a permissive subject of
bargaining, the employer is helpless to
obtain, through interest arbitration,
any relief from these provisions.  The
union only needs to espouse that it no
longer wishes to negotiate over this
permissive topic, and the employer
must cease from further negotiations
over non-certified personnel or risk an
unfair labor practice charge.
For collective bargaining agree-
ments that contain a savings clause,
the employers can try to negotiate new
language to fix the problem using their
current certified staff. However, with-
out the appropriate savings clause
allowing renegotiation for those areas
of the contract that are declared null
and void by new statutory language,
employers will be left with the mid-
term bargaining rules established
through Illinois Labor Relations Board
caselaw. Mutual agreement must be
reached to re-open the contract mid-
term. Without union acquiescence to
the use of non-certified personnel, the
employer is going to be left with
considerable overtime problems due to
the shift coverage void that may be left
by the non-certified employees. Em-
ployers may find themselves danger-
ously understaffed for shift coverage
where non-certified staff had been
predominantly used.  This is especially
true among fire protection districts in
rural areas that rely a great deal upon
non-certified personnel.
Interest arbitrators will be faced
with a plethora of problems in
upcoming bargaining agreements
where the parties are not able to agree
on those issues ancillary to the
changes made by this statute.  Shift
schedules, overtime, promotions and
shift bidding are just a few of the
numerous provisions that will require
adjusting with the new legislation.
Although many of these provisions
may require significant changes,
interest arbitrators are going to be
reluctant to grant the relief necessary,
since they will have such a large
impact on the bargaining unit and
may be considered "breakthrough"
contract provisions. Arbitrators are
reluctant to grant such contract
provisions absent the normal quid pro
quo associated with collectively bar-
gaining at the table.
VIII. Public Act 095-0316
Effective January 1, 2008, Public Act
095-0316 amended Section 6 of the
Workers' Compensation Act41 and
amended Section 1 of the Occupational
Disease Act.42  The change to Section 1
provides that "any condition or
impairment of health, directly or
indirectly from any blood borne
pathogen, lung or respiratory disease
or condition, heart or vascular disease
or condition, hypertension, tuberculo-
sis or cancer resulting in any
disability," whether it be temporary,
permanent, total or partial, to a
firefighter, EMT or paramedic is
"rebuttably presumed" to arise out of
and in the course of an employee's
employment and "causally connected
to the hazards or exposures of the
employment."43 The rebuttable pre-
sumption also applies to hearing loss
or hernia.44   The presumption applies
only to those firefighters, EMTs or
paramedics who have been employed
in that capacity for more than five
years at the time the claim is filed.45
Any findings by the Illinois Worker's
Compensation Commission under the
rebuttable presumption provisions of
this statute are not to be admissible or
"deemed res judicata for any disability
claim under the Illinois Pension Code
arising out of the same medical
condition."46
The statute specifically states that
it is not intended to make any change
in the law set forth in Krohe v. City of
Bloomington.47 In Krohe, a Bloom-
ington firefighter sought payment for
his and his family's health insurance
in accordance with the provisions of
Section 10(a) of the Public Safety
Employee Benefits Act.48   Firefighter
Krohe received a decision from the
Municipal Pension Board that he was
disabled due to a line of duty injury
that he sustained while working.49
The city refused to take the finding of
the Pension Board and equate it with a
"catastrophic injury" under the Public
Safety Employee Benefits Act.50
Instead, the city chose to define
catastrophic injuries as those injuries
that "severely limit the earning power
of the affected employee."51 The Illinois
Supreme Court rejected that interpre-
tation and instead accepted the
Pension Board's adjudication of line of
duty disability as a sufficient basis for
a "catastrophic injury," relying heavily
upon the legislative history of the
Act.52
Employers may want to bargain
collectively over language that will
help them in rebutting the presump-
tion that arises under the statute.
Regular physical exams or tests, the
use of mandatory protective equip-
ment, and reporting protocols will all
be important aids to the employer in
rebutting this presumption.
IX. Public Act 095-0142
As of August 13, 2007, the Illinois
Legislature amended the Local Gov-
ernmental Employees Political Rights
Act by changing Section 12 to provide
that a firefighter elected to the Illinois
General Assembly shall be granted
leave of absence without compensation
during his or her term of office upon
written application to his or her
employer.53 Although this may not
seem to be a significantly important
change in the law, it will impact some
collective bargaining agreements. For
example, employers may negotiate
provisions in their collective bargain-
ing agreement for a stay in seniority
accrual or in the accrual of other
benefits during such an absence.  In
addition, it is likely that questions will
5
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arise as to where that employee falls on
the seniority roster when he or she
returns to the firehouse. Likewise,
this amendment will prompt bargain-
ing over wages or other benefits, such
as vacation accrual. In particular,
bargaining will be necessary when
existing agreements include a longev-
ity step system that awards wage
increases without regard to merit, but
are based solely upon years of service.
X. Public Act 095-0681
Public Act 095-0681 amends the
downstate Firefighter's Pension Code54
in a number of ways. Under the act, a
disability pension may not be paid
until the firefighter has been exam-
ined by three physicians at the pension
board's expense. The amendment clari-
fies that the three physicians need not
agree as to the existence of any
disability or the nature and extent of a
disability. This raises the question
that if two of the three physicians
determine that there is no disability,
may the pension board rely on just one
physician in making a determination
that disability attaches under the act.
 The amendment further provides
that no physical or mental disability
that constitutes, in whole or in part,
the basis of the application for
disability benefits  may be used, in
whole or in part, by any municipality
or fire protection district employing
firefighters, EMTs or  paramedics as
cause for discharge under its disciplin-
ary provisions. As a result of this
provision, employers will have to
amend rules and regulations of the
department that affect discipline.
Another provision in the amend-
ment will produce vast bargaining
between unions and the municipali-
ties. This provision states that upon a
determination that the firefighter,
EMT or paramedic has fully recovered
from a disability, the employer must
immediately reinstate and return the
individual to its payroll in the same
rank and grade held on the date he or
she was placed on disability. The
amendment further provides that  a
firefighter who successfully sues to
enforce the right to reinstatement is
entitled to recover reasonable court
costs and attorney fees. Because the
act requires that the employee be
placed in the same "rank or grade held
at the date he or she was placed on
disability pension," unions and em-
ployers will have to negotiate seniority
accrual and wage rates based on
seniority during the absence of the
employee.  Similarly, the layoff and
recall provisions of a collective
bargaining agreement will be affected
if the employer is at a full compliment
of employees.  Employers will now
have to bargain with the unions so that
they can conduct layoffs that may be
necessitated by the return of a disabled
employee.
XI. Public Act 095-0243
Effective January 1, 2008, Public Act
095-0243 amended the Illinois Human
Rights Act55  to allow charging parties
the option of filing a Circuit Court
action instead of pursuing their
matter further with the Illinois
Department of Human Rights once:
(1) the Illinois Department of Human
Rights (IDHR) dismisses the charge
for lack of substantial evidence; (2) the
IDHR makes a substantial evidence
determination; or (3) the IDHR fails to
complete its investigation and issue a
report within 365 days after the charge
is filed.  The civil complaint must be
filed in the Circuit Court within 90
days of any of the three events listed
above and must be filed in the Circuit
Court in the county in which the
violation allegedly occurred.
These amendments will now allow
complainants the opportunity for a
jury trial where none existed.
However, complainants who received
a right to sue letter on a jointly filed
complaint with the Equal Opportunity
Commission and subsequently filed an
action in Federal Court will still be
barred.  Circuit Courts are likely to
find themselves flooded in the
beginning with a plethora of cases,
since plaintiff's lawyers will undoubt-
edly feel that the opportunities for
success are much higher with a jury
than they would be with the
Department of Human Rights.
XII. Summary
Perhaps the most significant change
made by the Illinois General Assembly
is the change to the IHRA allowing the
filing of civil actions.  Although this
will not have a serious effect on
collective bargaining agreements, it
will have a large impact on how these
cases are viewed by plaintiffs' lawyers.
From a collective bargaining stand-
point, perhaps the biggest concern for
employers will be the changes allowing
establishment of alternate dispute
resolution procedures where the Merit
Commission or Police and Fire
Commission already have exercised
control in that area. Finally,
firefighters, and those municipalities
that have full-time paid fire depart-
ments will have to wrestle with the
new provisions prohibiting the use of
non-certified personnel in the fire
department, absent a mutual agree-
ment with the Union. ◆
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In Laborers Local 751 v. Central
Community Unit School District No.
4, Case No. 2007-CA-0042-C, (IELRB
2008), the ILERB held that the district
violated Sections 14(a)(8) and 14(a)(1)
of the IELRA when it refused to comply
with an arbitrator's award. Local 751
represented a district employee in his
capacity as a head custodian. This
same employee also worked as a
substitute bus driver for the district,
and Local 751 did not represent him in
that capacity. The district terminated
his employment for using profanity in
the presence of school children and for
an incident which occurred while he
was serving as bus driver. Local 751
filed a grievance and an arbitrator
concluded that the district did not
have just cause to terminate the
employee, although the district did
have just cause for discipline. He
concluded that the district had a right
to be concerned about the employee's
behavior, but that the bus driving
incident could not be used to terminate
the employee from his position as head
custodian.
The district argued that the award
conflicted with several sections of the
School Code. The IELRB rejected the
argument, reasoning that no provision
of the School Code expressely covered
dismissal of support personnel for
cause. The district also argued that
the award contravened public policy.
The Illinois Supreme Court estab-
lished a two-step analysis to determine
whether an arbitrator's award vio-
lated public policy in AFSCME v.
Dept. of Central Management Ser-
vices, 173 Ill.2d 299, 671 N.E.2d 668
(1996), which requires a well-defined
and dominant public policy and a
violation of this public policy reflected
in the arbitrator's award. Here, the
district argued that the well-defined
public policy at issue was the
"protection of children." However, the
IELRB did not discover "any language
in the Illinois constitution, statutes, or
judicial decisions or any 'constant
practice of government officials'
reflecting public policy against use of
profanity in the presence of minors."
The IELRB concluded the arbitrator's
award did not violate public policy.
The District also argued that the
arbitrator did not have authority
under the collective bargaining agree-
ment to review the merits of the
employee's discharge or to modify the
discharge once he found just cause for
discipline. However, given the pre-
sumption that an arbitrator does not
exceed his or her authority if he or she
acts in good faith and that nothing in
the collective bargaining agreement
prohibited the arbitrator from rein-
stating a discharged employee, the
IELRB concluded the arbitrator did
not exceed his authority.
Discrimination
In SPEED Education Association,
IEA-NEA, v. SPEED District No. 802,
Case No. 2006-CA-0013-C, (IELRB
2008), the IELRB affirmed the decision
of an ALJ, who determined that the
district violated Sections 14(a)(3) and





In IUOE Local 520 v. Village of
Maryville, Case No. S-RC-07-038
(ILRB State Panel 2008), the State
Panel affirmed the ALJ's recommen-
dation that the Board direct a
representation election for all workers
at the Village's Water and Sewer and
Street Department, including plant
operators. The Board rejected the
village's claim that plant operators are
"professional employees" within the
meaning of the IPLRA. Under the
IPLRA, professional employees are
those engaged in work that "[is]
predominantly intellectual and varied
in character . . . involving the
consistent exercise of discretion," and
a teacher, Rachel Warning. Com-
mencing employment in August of
2001, Warning served the district as
high school teacher of students with
severe physical disabilities.  During
the first three years of her employ-
ment, Warning received satisfactory
evaluations from her superiors.  As
late as November 22, 2004, Warning's
performance was described by a
superior as "outstanding."
However, in December of 2004,
Warning came under scrutiny for her
performance. On  or around December
4, 2004, Warning was counseled about
her alleged use of profanity.  In March
2005, Warning received a negative
evaluation from her assigned evalua-
tor, Benoit Runyan, who had observed
Warning's classroom performance.
Runyan, who was the Principal of the
Program for Adaptive Learning,
served Warning with a corrective
action plan and notified Warning that
if her performance did not approve by
March 1, 2005, he would recommend
that the district terminate her
employment.
A meeting was scheduled to discuss
Warning's corrective action plan on
March 4, 2005.  Warning requested
that a union representative, Beth
Wierzbicki, be permitted to accom-
pany her to the meeting.  Although the
district did not prevent Wierzbicki
from attending the meeting, Warning
was informed that involving the Union
would make things harder.  Later that
day, Warning was told by Runyan that
Wierzbicki would not be permitted to
accompany her to any other meetings.
Subsequently, on March 18, 2005,
Wierzbicki was allowed to attend a
meeting with Warning, Runyan, and
the District's Executive Director, Dr.
Betty Pointer, but was prohibited from
speaking during the meeting.
On March 24, 2005, the district
informed Warning that her contract
would not be renewed for the following
school year. Although, Runyan  testi-
fied that the District would have
renewed Warning had she success-
fully completed her corrective action
plan, in an April 22, 2005 memoran-
dum, Runyan continued to criticize
Warning's performance.  The memo-
randum also called into question
Warning's actions, noting that she
chose to erect barriers to efficient
communication. Following this memo-
randum, on or around April 28, 2005,
Warning was notified by Dr. Pointer
that her contract would not be
renewed.
The ALJ determined that Runyan's
reference in his memorandum to
Warning's "choices" was a specific
reference to her insistence on
Wierzbicki's attendance at meetings.
The ALJ therefore concluded that the
district violated Sections 14(a)(3) and
14(a)(1) when it terminated Warning's
employment.
Affirming the ALJ, the IELRB
found that Warning engaged in
protected activity when she invoked
representation by Wierzbicki. The
IELB also found that the district
terminated Warning in retaliation for
invoking the representation of
Wierzbicki.  The IELRB found that the
ALJ's determination that the use of
the term "choices" in Runyan's
memorandum referred to Warning's
choice to invoke Wierzbicki's represen-
tation was supported by the record.
Accordingly, the IELRB determined
that Warning established a prima
facie case.
The IELRB next determined that
the district's suggested reasons for its
actions were pretext for unlawful
retaliation under the Act. Runyan's
memorandum cited Warning's poor
performance as a basis for her
termination.However, the same mem-
orandumreferenced Warning's  choices,
and chastised Warning for inhibiting
the communication process.  This, the
IELRB determined,demonstrated that
the district's stated reasons for
Warning's termination were a pretext
for unlawful retaliation.
The district also contended that the
ALJ erred in ordering the reinstate-
ment of Warning with tenure.  In
particular, the district contended that
the Illinois School Code granted it the
sole power to terminate teachers and
that this power may not be delegated.
The IELRB disagreed.
The IELRB noted that under
Section 15 of the IELRA, the IELRB
may require that a party cease its
unfair practice, and to take additional
affirmative action.This includes affir-
mative action to restore the injured
party to the position she would have
been in had a violation of the Act not
occurred.  Accordingly, the ILERB
determined that the ALJ properly
ordered Warning reinstated with
tenure.
Two IELB members dissented in
part. Members Lamont and Robinson
agreed that the district violated
Sections 14(a)(3) and 14(a)(1), but con-
cluded that the ALJ's award of
reinstatement and tenure was
improper. Members Lamont and
Robinson did not agree that the IELRB
has the authority to order tenure
under the IELRA.
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In Metropolitan Alliance of Police,
Chapter No. 294 v. Illinois, Depart-
ments of Central Management Ser-
vices and Corrections, Case No. S-RC-
05-090 (ILRB State Panel 2008), the
State Panel affirmed the ALJ's
approval of certain bargaining units
for purposes of representation elec-
tions.  The employees to be represented
were internal security investigators
(investigators) of the Illinois Depart-
ment of Corrections.  Several compet-
ing unions filed representation peti-
tions seeking to represent these
employees.  The Metropolitan Alliance
of Police petitioned to be certified to
represent 16 persons employed as
investigators.  AFSCME  petitioned to
add the same 16 investigators to its
already extant bargaining unit.
AFSCME also filed a petition in
another case seeking a representation
election for a bargaining unit
containing all investigators employed
by the state in any department,
Representation Proceedings
including the Department of Correc-
tions. The Illinois State Employees
Association,Laborers  Local 2002
(ISEA) successfully intervened in the
AFSCME petition seeking the repre-
sentation election.
The employer opposed all of the
petitions, arguing  that the investiga-
tors were "confidential employees"
under the IPLRA. Second, the em-
ployer argued that the proposed MAP
bargaining unit was too narrow in
scope and that the smallest appropri-
ate unit would be a state-wide unit
containing all similarly titled
employees. Third, the employer ar-
gued AFSCME's petitions seeking to
add investigators to preexisting bar-
gaining units would create impermis-
sible conflicts of interest because the
investigators would have to investi-
gate wrongdoing by fellow bargaining
unit members, which would arguably
undermine collective bargaining.
The ALJ found that the investiga-
tors were not confidential under the
IPLRA, rejected the conflicts of
interest argument, determined that
the 16 investigators to be represented
were "security employees" under the
IPLRA, and determined that all of the
proposed bargaining units sought by
the various representation petitions
were appropriate. Based on these
determinations, the ALJ recommended
a representation election for the 16
Department of Corrections investiga-
tors in which they would choose among
MAP representation in a stand-alone
bargaining unit, AFSCME represen-
tation in an extant bargaining unit, or
no representation at all.  Further, the
ALJ recommended a representation
election for all investigators not
employed in the Department of
Corrections in which they would
choose among AFSCME's extant
bargaining unit, an ISEA stand-alone
unit, or no representation.
The Board adopted all of the ALJ's
recommendations but did not reach
the "security employee" issue. Decid-
ing this issue was unnecessary
because the Department of Correc-
tions investigators shared a commu-
nity of interest sufficient to render
MAP's sought-after bargaining unit
appropriate.
Subjects of Bargaining
In Aurora Sergeants Ass'n v. City of
Aurora, Case No. S-CA-06-115 (ILRB
State Panel 2008), the State Panel
held that the City of Aurora
committed an unfair labor practice
when it unilaterally altered the
number of employees who could take
Sundays off.   The Aurora Sergeants
Association represents all sergeants
employed by the employer. Since 2000,
up to three sergeants could be off duty
each day Sunday through Thursday
and up to two sergeants could be off
duty each day on Fridays and
Saturdays.  Without bargaining, the
city unilaterally  reduced the number
of sergeants who could be off duty on
Sundays from three to two.
The city argued that the status quo
was not changed and that the change
in time off on Sundays was a
"manning" decision over which there
is no duty to bargain under Section
14(i) of the IPLRA.  Moreover, the city
argued that its actions were under-
taken as part of its "inherent
managerial authority" under Section
4 of the IPLRA and as such, it was
under no duty to bargain.
The ALJ rejected all of the city's
arguments and the Board affirmed.
The Board considered the first two
arguments together because the city
argued that the status quo of
management prerogative in manning
decisions was unchanged.  This was
essentially the same as the "manning"
argument. The city had a duty to
bargain over the change to Sunday
time off because this change, i.e. when
sergeants could schedule their time
off, was a matter of "wages, hours and
terms and conditions of employment"
under the IPLRA.  In so holding, the
"require[s] advanced knowledge in a
field of science or learning customarily
acquired by a prolonged course of spe-
cialized intellectual instruction . . . ”
The Board held that the plant
operators "exercised discretion" at
most, four hours per day, with the rest
of the time filled with routine work.
Moreover, the village did not require
that the plant operators have
advanced scientific knowledge gained
through prolonged study. None of the
plant operators had a college degree.
The Board also rejected the village's
argument that the bargaining unit
was "inappropriate" under Section 9(b)
of the IPLRA. The fact that operators
and laborers were in the same unit,
that they worked at different loca-
tions, and that they performed
different types of work and had
different job requirements and work-




Board distinguished between a "man-
ning" decision to add another sergeant
to Sunday shifts and a reduction in the
number of sergeants who may take
Sundays off.
Likewise, the Board joined the ALJ
in rejecting the city's "inherent
managerial authority" argument.
The Board presumed  the city's  actions
fell under the definition of "inherent
managerial authority." Where a
matter of wages, hours, or terms and
conditions of employment is at issue
and where the matter is concurrently
one of inherent managerial authority,
the proper test is to "balance the
benefits that bargaining will have on
the decision-making process with the
burdens that bargaining will impose
on the employer's authority."  Here,
the Board found that the sergeants'
and union's interest in bargaining
"significantly outweigh[ed]" any bur-
den such bargaining may impose on
the employer's authority, as the city
failed to show that bargaining would
impose any significant burden onits
authority. Supervisors
In AFSCME Council 31 v. Depart-
ment of Central Management Ser-
vices, Case No. S-RC-04-066 (ILRB
State Panel 2008), the State Panel
affirmed the ALJ's decision to grant
the union's petition and allow the
union, pursuant to a showing of
majority interest, to represent Depart-
ment of Central Management Services
employees in the title of Public Service
Administrator. The Board rejected the
State's argument that such employees
were "statutory supervisors" under
the IPLRA, explaining that supervi-
sors "direct" the work of subordinates.
To "direct," an alleged supervisor
must have "significant discretionary
authority to affect the employment of
his or her subordinates." Here, the
Public Service Administrators did not
direct, because they only prioritized
and had responsibility for the upkeep
of their subordinates' inventory,
ensured their subordinates' train-
ing and monitored the quantity and
quality of their subordinates' work.
The Board agreed with the ALJ
that these job requirements lacked
significant discretionary authority
to affect the employment of
subordinates.
In AFSCME, Council 31 v.
Peoria Housing Authority, Case
No.S-UC-07-020 (ILRB State Panel
2008), the State Panel agreed with
the ALJ that the Peoria Housing
Authority's asset manager and
assistant asset manager were not
supervisors, managers, or confi-
dential employees, and were thus
properly included in the bargaining
unit.  The authority had created
the titles of Asset Manager and
Assistant Asset Manager in re-
sponse to funding policy changes by
the U.S. Department of Housing
and Urban Development.  It argued
that these positions were supervi-
sory because they allegedly en-
tailed hiring, suspending, promot-
ing, discharging, disciplining, di-
recting, and adjusting subordinate
employees' grievances. The ALJ
and Board disagreed, holding that
these positions lacked the requisite
independent judgment in exercis-
ing authority under the eleven
recognized supervisory indicia for
supervisory status.  Recommenda-
tions made by these managers had
to be independently approved by a
human resources manager.  More-
over, hiring decisions were made
based on consensus and not on an
individual manager's initiative.
Overall, the authority failed to
carry its evidentiary burden in
demonstrating that the managers
should be excluded.  The Board
found the authority's evidence to be
conclusory.
Likewise, the Board rejected
the claim that the positions were
managerial under the IPLRA.
Managerial status requires that
In SEIU, Local 73 v. Illinois
Secretary of State, Case No. S-CA-05-
156 (ILRB State Panel 2008), the State
Panel  held that the Secretary of State
committed an unfair labor practice
when it unilaterally implemented a
sign-in/sign-out policy for union
stewards conducting union business
at their workstations.  The governing
collective bargaining agreement al-
lowed stewards to leave their work
area to engage in union business. Per
an arbitrator's interpretation, stew-
ards could spend a "reasonable amount
of time" on union business at their
workstations. In response, the em-
ployer implemented the sign-in/sign-
out policy to ensure it could evaluate
the stewards' job performance.  The
employer argued that the policy was
not a mandatory subject of bargaining.
In rejecting the employer's argu-
ment, the Board found that the policy
affected conditions of employment
because stewards could be disciplined
for violating the policy.  Further, the
Board found that the policy was not a
matter of inherent managerial au-
thority, but noted that it would be a
mandatory subject of bargaining
either way.  Where a matter of wages,
hours, or terms and conditions of
employment is at issue and where the
matter is concurrently one of inherent
managerial authority, the proper test
is to "balance the benefits that
bargaining will have on the decision-
making process with the burdens that
bargaining will impose on the
employer's authority." Here, the Board
found that the employer failed to show
any emergency requiring unilateral
action or that it lacked other methods
of policing the amount of time
stewards spent on union business.
The Board concluded that the
stewards' interest in bargaining over
the policy "significantly outweigh[ed]"
any burden such bargaining may
impose on the employer's authority.
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employees "be engaged predominantly
in executive and management func-
tions" and be responsible for directing
the accomplishment of these func-
tions.  Here, the authority's Board of
Commissioners set policy and its
executive director was responsible for
carrying out the policies. The manag-
ers at issue  were not involved in either
function. Finally, the Board rejected
the authority's confidential employee
argument because it was based on the
conclusory assertion that the asset
managers would "be involved" in and
have "first-hand" knowledge of the
negotiations for the next collective
bargaining agreement.
In Metropolitan Alliance of Police v.
Village of Western Springs, Case No.
S-RC-06-081,(ILRB State Panel 2008)
the  State Panel affirmed the ALJ's
decision to certify the Metropolitan
Alliance of Police as the exclusive
representative for a bargaining unit
consisting of all full-time police
sergeants. The Board  rejected the
village's argument that the sergeants
were statutory supervisors. A peace
officer is a supervisor within the
meaning of the IPLRA, if he: 1) has
principal work substantially different
from that of his subordinates; 2) has
authority to perform one or more of the
eleven enumerated supervisory func-
tions, or to effectively recommend such
performance; and 3) consistently
exercises independent judgment in the
interest of the employer in connection
with his supervisory activity.
Applying this test, the Board
explained that the sergeants did not
have the requisite independent au-
thority to be deemed supervisors under
the Act. Although the sergeants issued
oral and written reminders to their
subordinates, such reminders did not
serve as an organized disciplinary
system. Moreover, the Board ex-
plained, the sergeants only reported
gross misconduct and did not have
authority to recommend disciplinary
action that would take effect "as a
matter of course, without independent
review."
The ILRB also rejected the Village's
claim that the sergeants had supervi-
sory authority to "direct" the employ-
ees in the subordinate ranks,
explaining that "direction" must
involve discretionary authority to
affect the subordinates' terms and
conditions of employment. Here, there
was no evidence that the sergeants
had authority to direct work.
EEO Developments
Enforcement Procedure
In Federal Express Corp. v. Holowecki,
128 S. Ct. 1147 (2008), the Supreme
Court defined the term "charge" in the
context of an EEOC filing under the
Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967 (ADEA).  The Court held
that for an EEOC filing to be
considered a "charge," it must provide
the information required in 29 C.F.R.
§ 1626.8(a), i.e. the names, addresses,
and telephone numbers of the
charging party and the charged party;
a statement of facts describing the
allegedly discriminatory act; the
number of employees working for the
charged employer; and a statement
indicating whether the charging party
has initiated any state proceedings.  In
addition, to be considered a "charge,"
an EEOC filing "must be reasonably
construed as a request for the agency
to take remedial action to protect the
employee's rights or otherwise settle a
dispute between the employer and the
employee."
In 1994 and 1995, Federal Express
Corporation (FedEx) started two new
programs aimed at increasing produc-
tivity. Fourteen current and former
FedEx employees sued under the
ADEA alleging that the programs
were a pretext for discrimination
against older employees directed
toward forcing older employees out of
the company before they became
entitled to their retirement benefits.
An employee filed a Form 283 "Intake
Questionnaire" with the EEOC in
December 2001 and attached a 6-page
affidavit detailing her allegations and
asking the EEOC to "[p]lease force
Federal Express to end their age
discrimination."  Thereafter, she and
the other respondents filed a lawsuit in
the Southern District of New York.
Still later, she filed a Form 5 formal
charge with the EEOC.  Under the
ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 626(d), a charge
must be filed with the EEOC at least 60
days before filing a lawsuit.  The first
issue was how to define a "charge" for
ADEA purposes.  The second issue was
whether the intake questionnaire and
affidavit constituted a "charge" such
as to render the lawsuit  timely under
the ADEA.
The district court determined
these documents were insufficient for
a "charge" and dismissed the  case.
The Second Circuit disagreed and
reversed. The Supreme Court  af-
firmed the Second Circuit.
The employees argued that the
definition of "charge" should conform
to the catchall provision at 29 C.F.R. §
1626.6, stating that a "charge" is
"sufficient" if it is "in writing and ...
name[s] the prospective respondent
and ... generally allege[s] the discrimi-
natory acts(s)." Justice Kennedy,
writing for the 7-2 majority, rejected
this reasoning because it would cause
a "charge" to arise whenever individu-
als approach the EEOC with questions
or complete the Intake Questionnaire .
FedEx argued that a "charge"
exists only once  when the EEOC has
fulfilled is obligations to notify the
charged employer of the allegations
and begin the conciliation process.
The Court rejected this view as "too
artificial a reading of the statute to
accept."
The EEOC as amicus curiae,
argued that a "charge" exists where
the entire filing is properly construed
as an employee request for the EEOC
to vindicate his or her ADEA rights.
The Court deferred to the EEOC
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accepting this proposed test as
"consistent with the employee's filing
statutory framework" of the ADEA.
The Court held these to be a "charge"
under the ADEA because it contained
all of the requisite information under
29 C.F.R. § 1626.8(a) and contained a
statement in the affidavit asking the
EEOC to "force Federal Express to end
their age discrimination," which is
reasonably construed as a request for
remedial action.
Evidence
In Sprint/United Management Co. v.
Mendelsohn, 128 S. Ct. 1140 (2008),
the Supreme Court considered the
propriety of admitting "me too"
evidence of certain nonparty witnesses
in a discrimination claim brought
under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA).  The
Court held that Federal Rules of
Evidence 401 and 403 "do not make
["me too"] evidence per se admissible or
per se inadmissible" and that the
question of admissibility "requires a
fact-intensive, context-specific in-
quiry" appropriate for initial determi-
nation at the district court level.
Mendelsohn was employed in the
Business Development Strategy Group
of  Sprint/United Management Com-
pany from 1989 to 2002.  Sprint
terminated her employment in 2002 as
part of an ongoing workforce reduc-
tion.  She sued under the ADEA on a
disparate treatment theory.  To
support her claim, she sought to
introduce testimony from five non-
party witnesses who would attest to
discriminatory practices and an
animus toward persons over the age of
40. This testimony would have
implicated a company-wide policy of
age discrimination.
Sprint moved in limine to exclude
the witness testimony, arguing that it
was irrelevant because the five
employee witnesses were not similarly
situated to Mendelsohn.  According to
Sprint,  all five worked in a different
division from Mendelsohn and re-
ported to different supervisors.
The district court granted Sprint's
motion in a minute order containing
only cursory analysis.  The Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals interpreted
the minute order as an application of a
per se rule against the sort of "me too"
evidence at issue in this case and
reversed the district court.  The Tenth
Circuit then engaged in its own Rule
403 balancing.
 Justice Thomas, writing for a
unanimous court, held that it was
unclear from the minute order
whether the district court actually
applied a per se rule or instead engaged
in the proper relevance analysis under
Rules 401 and 403.  The Tenth Circuit
was wrong to presume the former.
Accordingly, the Court vacated the
Tenth Circuit's judgment and re-
manded the case with instructions for
the district court to "clarify the basis
for its evidentiary ruling under the
applicable Rules" of Evidence.
First Amendment Develop-
ments
In Utah Education Ass'n v. Shurtleff,
512 F.3d 1254 (10th Cir. 2008), the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit struck down a Utah law that
banned public employees from using
automatic payroll deductions for
political contributions.  The Voluntary
Contributions Act (VCA) was passed
by the Utah legislature in 2001 and
prohibited local government employ-
ers from withholding voluntary
political contributions from employ-
ees' paychecks. These political contri-
butions included contributions to
union political funds.
The Tenth Circuit observed that
political contributions have long been
recognized as a form of speech.
Accordingly, by banning a particular
contribution method, VCA burdened
speech to some extent.   However, not
all restrictions on speech are unconsti-
tutional.  In that regard, Utah argued
that the nonpublic forum doctrine
applied  and  it only had to demonstrate
that the restriction on speech was
reasonable. The Tenth Circuit, dis-
agreed.
Examining a variety of factors, the
Tenth Circuit reasoned that Utah
counties, cities, and school districts
were independent of the state for First
Amendment analysis. Therefore, while
Utah had a special interest in
controlling speech on its own property,
it did not enjoy the same special
interest with respect to counties,
cities, and school districts.
Turning to the level of scrutiny to
apply, the Tenth Circuit noted that the
VCA did not restrict all aspects of
speech. Rather, the VCA only
restricted speech in respect to political
contributions.  Therefore, the Tenth
Circuit determined that strict scru-
tiny did not apply.  Instead, the Tenth
Circuit applied an exacting standard of
scrutiny under which contribution
restrictions were permissible only if
they were closely drawn to match a
sufficiently important interest.
While disruption of the workplace
by partisan politics may serve an
important governmental interest un-
der a lower level of scrutiny, the Tenth
Circuit determined that under exact-
ing scrutiny, the state lacked a
sufficiently important interest. More-
over, the state failed to show how a
prohibition on payroll deductions
would reduce partisan politics in the
workplace. Accordingly, the Tenth




 IPER REPORT Spring 2008
12
The Report Subscription Form (Volume 25, Numbers 1-4)
The publication of The Illinois Public Employee Relations Report reflects a continuing effort by Chicago-Kent College of Law
and the Institute of Labor and Industrial Relations to provide education services to labor relations professionals in Illinois.
The Report is available by subscription through Chicago-Kent College of Law at a rate of $40.00 per calendar year for four
issues. To subscribe to IPER Report, please complete this form and return it with a check or billing instructions to:
Institute for Law and the Workplace
Chicago-Kent College of Law
Illinois Institute of Technology
565 W. Adams Street
Chicago, IL  60661-3691
Please start my subscription to IPER Report.
Please bill me.
Enclosed is my check payable to Chicago-Kent College of Law.
We also accept MasterCard, VISA and Discover Card;
Please complete the following information:







Address (Please give address where the IPER Report should be mailed.)
Tel.: Date:
The Illinois Public Employee Relations Report provides current, nonadversarial information to those involved or
interested in employer-employee relations in public employment. The authors of bylined articles are responsible for
the contents and for the opinions and conclusions expressed. Readers are encouraged to submit comments on the
contents, and to contribute information on developments in public agencies or public-sector labor relations. The
Illinois Institute of Technology and University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign are affirmative action/equal opportu-
nities institutions.
Illinois Public Employee Relations Report . . .
Published quarterly by The Institute of Labor and Industrial Relations University
of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and Chicago-Kent College of Law llinois Institute of
Technology,  (ISSN 1559-9892), 565 West Adams Street, Chicago, Illinois  60661-3691.
Faculty Editors:     Student Editors:
Peter Feuille and Martin Malin     Russ Eisenstein, Lindsay M. Ferg,
Production Editor:    Christopher W. Jacob, and David Mussatt
Sharon Wyatt-Jordan
